As I pointed out last week in How will the SHSP’s Next-Gen Space Plan Unfold? August 8 was supposed to be Change You Can Believe In day when the SHSP was to finalize the transfer of power of authority of the QZSS system development to the CO along with the budgetary powers to complete it, largely at the expense of MEXT. According to Matsui Sensei, MEXT is going down fighting and it is unclear whether the deal will go through.

As I pointed out last time,   June 30′s  政府の宇宙開発利用体制の在り方について(案) represents a compromise- originally the 宇宙庁 was to have complete control of space policy and budget, but according to Matsui Sensei, it represents a stealth-step in the right direction. If the plan works, then the CO will have seized control of Japan’s largest ever space infrastructure project, involving the building of a 7 or 8 satellite constellation of Michibiki satellites that will provide sub-1 meter positioning and emergency communications and as yet undisclosed (to be worked out- nothing sinister) functions.

For those of you familiar with the QZSS project, the CO taking charge is both a practical solution and a master stroke all at once, removing the in-fighting that has plagued the project for the best part of a decade and firmly putting the CO in charge of space national security and public infrastructure.

Meanwhile the General Space Activities budget is due for a savage beating, with the DPJ trying to enforce a 30% cut in some science and technology fighting. The Basic Plan for Space Policy of June 2009- take a look at page 8,  looks to have been reduced to administrative 瓦礫　(gareki= rubble).

To see how things pan out, watch this space!

One of Wang’s primary arguments for explaining away China’s belligerence on the high sees, see for example the harassment of USNS Impeccable in international waters being one of the more minor incidents, is the need of the Chinese leadership to pander to the rabid nationalism it has created. In a country where free political debate is censored, nationalism is one of the few outlets. Now this monster has been released it must be pacified, leading to public hyperventilation and hyperbole and adolescent bullying on the seas.

Tuesday’s release of Japan’s 37th White Paper however gets to grips with the real issue at hand- China’s claims to sovereign rights and ju­risdiction over its Exclusive Economic Zone.  This key issue is a recipe for disaster. Coping with it will be a major task in hand for the U.S.-Japan Alliance until China implodes.

In any case, here is the full article:

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU TOKYO — Japan’s new defense white paper hints at an expecta­tion of long-term declines in U.S. military and economic strength and reflects an unprecedented level of concern about China.

“China’s future actions are wor­risome, given what can be inter­preted as its overbearing ways to address its clashing interests with neighboring countries, in­cluding Japan,” says the Aug. 2 paper by the Ministry of Defense (MoD), titled “Defense of Japan 2011.” Chinese government officials were quick to respond in Japan­ese media reports. Ma Zhaoxu, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized “irre­sponsible comments,” while Chi­nese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng accused Japan of deliberately exaggerating a “Chi­na threat.” At issue is the Japanese word “koatsuteki,” which can also be translated as “assertive,” and is used in an unofficial translation of the white paper to describe Japan’s concerns about China’s military modernization and ex­panding maritime reach, said Jun Okumura, adviser at the Eurasia Group here.

“The MoD merely said what everyone had on their minds,” Okumura said. “The Chinese side responded in kind.” Okumura said Tokyo would be remiss not to comment on recent provocations by the Chinese Navy, including multiple incur­sions into Japanese territorial waters by destroyers and nu­clear-powered submarines, and the “buzzing” of vessels and airspace. All this comes after China’s 20-year military buildup and a quadrupling of military spending in the last decade.

Analysts said much of the paper’s language and approach echo longstanding themes: It calls the U.S. Japan alliance “indispensable,” warns of cyber attacks, and so on.

“It is very much in line with what you would expect in a year with a revised NDPG,” the National Defense Program Guidelines released in December, said Christopher Hughes, a professor of interna­tional politics and Japanese studies at Britain’s University of Warwick.

But the paper also mentions a “global shift in the balance of power” — code for potential long-term U.S. military and eco­nomic decline.

A reference to territorial disputes, though brief, is ominous, according to Pe­ter Woolley, a professor of comparative politics at Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey.

“Japan is geographically surrounded by water and has a long coastline and numer­ous islands,” Woolley said. “Invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack. Any Japanese reader knows very well that the retreat of U.S. in­fluence, to be replaced by that of new ac­tors, is problematic and complex for Japan.” South Korea is complaining about Tokyo’s claims on the Sea of Japan islands that Seoul calls Dokdo.

The paper also notes that China plans to expand its maritime activities. That reflects growing Japanese and U.S. concern about Beijing’s claims to sovereign rights and ju­risdiction over its Exclusive Economic Zone, said James Manicom, a naval expert at Cana­da’s Balsillie School of International Affairs. “I don’t think the tone is that surprising,” Manicom said. “The most important differ­ence as it relates to maritime issues is the addition of China’s interpretation of inter­national law as a subject of concern.” The paper reflects concern about North Korea’s new Musudan ballistic missile, which can hit Guam, and other threats, said Alessio Patalano, an expert on Japanese mil­itary issues at Kings College, London.

“The sinking of the Cheonan, the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, China’s air­craft and carrier programs, are other exam­ples. Japan’s response was clear and sought to underline the potential risk presented by the missile programs of North Korea, and by China’s evolving behavior at sea,” Patalano said.

The paper also contains a 13-page section on the March 11 Great East Japan Earth­quake, lauding the U.S. response that in­cluded about 16,000 troops, 15 vessels and 140 aircraft.

The aid operation “looms large because it is important to a beleaguered Japanese pub­lic, because Japan is genuinely grateful and prepared to say so,” Woolley said.

Despite bitter complaints about stacked committees and placements (oh it pains me not to write about them) showing that Japanese bureaucratic battles can be just as downright dirty and corrupt as a Brooklyn Ward (or British Borough) election, MEXT would seem to have done pretty well out of it so far. Remember, back in 2008 the Basic Law’s key point was to, within 2 years, have the SHSP design a Cabinet-led 宇宙庁 (Space Agency) focused on promoting the use of space for national security, applications and industrialization- all anathema to MEXT, which has maintained control of around 60% of the entire space budget through its control of the R&D oriented JAXA.

With an attitude similar to that of Charlton Heston at the NRA, or perhaps, more like that of Jim Hacker defending the great British Sausage, in an astonishing achievement revelead in June 30′s 政府の宇宙開発利用体制の在り方について(案) 平成23年6月30日 MEXT has managed to whittle down the SHSP’s proposal to taking about 30% of its budget.

Why astonishing? Well the whole point of the Basic Space Law (宇宙基本法（骨子) was to rip the power away from MEXT in the first place (see several dozen of my articles in Space News down the years), in particular, fight the 今後の宇宙政策の在り方に関する 有識者会議 提言書 put together by Matsui Sensei, which de facto proposed a revolution in space organization, and did so in only 5 pages. Can you imagine something so beautifully clear and direct as to delineate a major Japanese governmental powerbroking revolution in ONLY FIVE PAGES?

No wonder it wasn’t popular! Here is the original article I wrote about the Matsui initiative, arranged by Seiji Maehara to put the cat among the pigeons. We’ll see how things pan out on Monday.

The Matsui Report was not popular with MEXT but popular with METI...

It’s cheap journalism to say that the battle between the F-35 and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is heating up, because it’s only heating up in the press- the battle has been heating up between Lockheed Martin and Boeing for some time. After talking to people very familiar with what is going on, it does seem as budget pressures are putting a new sheen on the previously unfancied Super Hornet.

Let’s backtrack a few years. Ever since the tsunami of kokusanka in aerospace collided, broke, and ebbed on the impenetrable need to maintain good offices with the U.S.  in the FSX crisis (as told so well by Michael Green in Arming Japan, p.86-107 ) Japan’s aerospace ambitions long ago turned back to Meiji priorities- get the best technology in the world available and indigenize it.

The current war of words between the F-35 and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and, indeed, the Eurofighter- which has many champions here among impartial observers- speaks volumes to the shifting and juggling of priorities facing Japanese planners.

Japan’s instinct was to have bought the F-22  and its stealth technology and pressed for squeezing as much technology and production transfer out of the U.S. as possible. A vain hope and crushed painfully.

The F-35 has been seen as the “next best thing” as it is a “5th generation” airframe that is stealthy and has all its weapons, fuel tanks and etc. subsumed into the airframe. But the F-35 has been fighting terrible battles of its own (see The Economist’s The last manned fighter for more details) with well publicized software and more serious difficulties and potentially soaring per-unit costs. Which is what made my private interview with former Top Gun pilot and now F-35 Program Manager Stephen O’Bryan (below) even more important.

The critical issues are always balancing cost (especially expensive local production) vs. technology transfer (and assuaging/ pushback against U.S. technonationalism), vs. jobs for MHI and KHI, vs. maintaining the Alliance all balanced by the fact that unless Japan purchases top-of-the-line fighters, it probably sends terrible signals to the Chinese.

Bearing all this in mind, the really astonishing thing is the distance the Super Hornet has traveled over the past year or so in perception. Three years ago it was assumed this plane, based on a 40-year-old design, wouldn’t stand a chance against the F-35. Again there are faint echos of the FSX saga again. Back in the day Japan felt forced to drop its preference for the original F-18, in which TDRI could fit all sorts of cool J-gear such as CCV, composite wings and phased array radar, for the F-16 because of the increasing arrogance of McDonnell Douglas, which insisted on blocking any Japanese improvements on the plane without paying MD first…

How times have changed. With U.S. industry in fear of reduced procurement until the U.S. finds more clients to arm or wars to fight, Lockheed Martin and Boeing seem to be falling over themselves to offer better and better deals.

“There is a clear sense that improvements have been made and that from an industrial point of view F-35 will be a much better deal than one would have thought in the past. And that to me sounds like they’re trying to outbid the Europeans, because they are those offering access to technology know-how,” says my good friend Alessio Patalano over at Kings College, London.

Despite clouds remaining over the actual cost and operability of the F-35 Patalano thinks it would be a major mistake to opt for the F/A-18E because it’s cheap. Purchases like this RFP are actually tools of statecraft and in the fast evolving East Asian landscape, Japan needs to maintain a modern, advanced air force, one capable of measuring itself up against modernising regional forces, both operationally and technically, he says.

Anyway, here is the original article. Enjoy!

]]> http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/08/06/boeing%e2%80%99s-fa-18ef-super-hornet-fights-back/feed/ 0 http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/07/13/asnaro-project-upate-part-ii-a-new-pathway-for-nec/ http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/07/13/asnaro-project-upate-part-ii-a-new-pathway-for-nec/#comments Wed, 13 Jul 2011 04:51:15 +0000 admin http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/?p=830 Following on from an afternoon at NEC a while back, I was also fortunate enough to spend more or less a day at USEF catching up on METI’s space programs. What an eye-opening event that was, which will also mean that an entire chapter in an upcoming book and old friend and I are planning is now almost entirely focused on USEF. Space Environment Reliability Verification Integrated System SERVIS-2 for example yielded at least one internationally competitive technology that has become a major global success story, as well as building significant leaps forward in satellite design with the improved CFRP core and 3D heat pipes…on Melco’s COTs-testbed the SERVIS-1.

Anyway, back to the matter in hand: in promoting the ASNARO/Nextar project, USEF took a break from Melco, which has been the main beneficiary of spin on/off with USEF over the last 15 years, to switch to NEC, which had traditionally been- and still is- Japan’s master of smaller bus systems, communications and sensors. I have to qualify this statement by saying that when I mean small, I don’t mean the micro- nano- and picosatellites now being churned out by UNISEC members and others.

What I mean is NEC’s excellence in satellites such as Oicets/Kirari and work done for ISAS over the decasdes. Allied with the engineering tradition of Toshiba (in particular ETS-7 here is an old story and another here I did for Spacer and ETS-6), NEC should have by all accounts bounced back earlier from last decade’s scandal.

But they are back, big time with the small-medium ASNARO bus (see below graphic):

Back in the late 90s, as I mentioned in Part-I, NEC’s main challenge for the then-commercial constellation communications market was the Oicets bus for Teledesic.

Remember Skybridge, Celestri, Spaceway, Astrolink, and the rest of them?…how could we ever forget the time when it appeared the earth was about to be circled by hundreds of satellites dedicated to making our brick cellphones work so expensively…

That all went kaput, along with NEC’s credibility when the procurement scandal broke in 1998, all to conveniently sabotaging NEC’s bid for the IGS constellation. And it seemed for years that NEC had been cast adrift like Comets/ Kakehashi or Kiku-6 slowly frazzling in the radiation of bad publicity while sinking into a black hole of no major Engineering Test Satellite contracts for JAXA.

In many ways, with the seizure of the IGS contracts by Melco in 1998, the company surged ahead of NEC, which was left without heavy bus technology. With Melco also closely aligned to USEF, things were looking pretty grim for NEC which seemed to have been left behind from securing major contracts for NASDA/JAXA for the best part of a decade.

NEC’s position has turned the corner and improved by several developments, however.  

First miniturization and continual technical improvement mean that relatively small buses such as ASNARO’s can do a lot more than they could 20 years ago. These days, a middleweight can pack the punch of a heavyweight of yesteryear in some respects.  Related to this, there is swing back to the need for smaller, more flexible satellites as payloads and technology has advanced and ASNARO’s modular, plug and play capabilities could work just fine.

Second, more and differnet satellites are needed from multiple sources to build more solutions for Japan’s emerging national security space infrastructure.  Even with Melco recently announcing it planned to redouble its output at its Kamakura Works, Japan needs NEC.

Last but most importantly in some respects is the need for different solutions to promote Japanese space diplomacy in Asia, and South East Asia through APRSAF and ODA and against the rival Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization and CGWIC . Exploring this and related issues will be a key theme for my Ph.D. research at 慶應義塾大学 政策・メディア研究科 (Keio University’s Graduate School of Media and Governance).

In the coming decade, Southeast Asia needs to take decisions about developing its space infrastructure for human security and disaster and environmental warning/monitoring/relief and it’s vital that these are done with Japanese technologies, moving on from the Sentinel, SAFE, STAR and Micro-Star and PLATFORM  programs. And ASNARO/Nextar is just the sort of “platform” required. For more on this, see Part III (to come).  

One of the issues with In Defense of Japan is that it is not media friendly and not designed to be media friendly as we wanted to reach decision makers and analysts. Undoing misconceptions of Japan’s space program by decades of superficial coverage can’t be done by engaging the mass media as the message just does not jive, or jars with media  shibboleths. However, we are finding that people who are seriously interested in this area find the time to read In Defense of Japan through and “get” our arguments.

Peter’s take amounts to: “…this  writer is hard pressed indeed to identify any recent book in English  that comes close to covering as much ground as this one does.”

Here is an excerpt:

Review of In Defense of Japan by Peter J Brown

Many thanks Peter and keep up the good work on Japanese in Space!

]]> http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/07/11/new-review-of-in-defense-of-japan/feed/ 0 http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/06/30/asnaro-project-upate-part-i-delayed-but-not-doomed/ http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/06/30/asnaro-project-upate-part-i-delayed-but-not-doomed/#comments Thu, 30 Jun 2011 12:59:03 +0000 admin http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/?p=757

USERS SEM Deorbiting Pod

I was lucky enough recently to spend a day interviewing great people at METI, USEF, Pasco and NEC a little while back and managed to nail down many more details about what is happening with the ASNARO (Advanced Satellite with New system Architecture for Observation) project. For some Space News background on ASNARO, please see my original story. This time, specifically METI asked me to write about it for them, and gave tremendous help getting NEC and Pasco on board. It was just wonderful meeting people with ideas and strategies that are obviously well thought out.

Let’s get the disclaimer out of the way first.

From where we are standing, from the point of view of national security space, at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter if NEC succeeds in its strategy to turn the ASNARO/Nextar branded modular satellite platform into a commercial success in/for ASEAN countries. Of course it matters to NEC, because they are a private company and want to make more profit.

And of course it matters to me, because for the health of NEC and Japan’s military industrial base, it’s better that they sell or get more SE Asian nations to “buy” them through ODA and I wish them every luck.

But, at the end of the day, IF ASNARO/Sasuke/ Nextar never makes a successful commercial go of it, the Japanese government is still going to make sure the platform is built. And we predict that ASNARO will play its role in Japan’s emerging national space security infrastructure.

ASNARO is crucial to a number of players in a number of ways. After years of false starts and what may have been blind alleys — MDS-1 Tsubasa or OICETS Kirari spring to mind -

-Nextar represents what NEC has been trying to build since the late 90s (1998 if my memory serves me right, see NEC unveils prototype bus, aims for Teledesic, this being the non-Space News version) and the era of Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase. Nextar, which looks suspiciously like a reworked OICETS/ MDS bus to me, and it’s the keystone of their pan-Asian commercial turnkey systems strategy.

We’ll go into this in Part II.  In Part III, we’ll look at the military angle, but only when the official article is published in Defense News.

So what is ASNARO?

ASNARO is a USEF powerplay to develop a bus system that on one hand will give NEC a chance to compeat in the ASEAN market for EO sats, and whether or not that succeeds, gives Japan the option to build a constellation of spysatellites, all kicked of with a tiny down-payment of 6 billion yen.

Therefore ASNARO is important to METI to show that its decades-long investment in creating standardized satelite bus systems and plug and play and COTs parts at USEF is finally paying off. Those of you  who have read In Defense of Japan know that we more or less regard USEF as METI’s DARPA, or military space arm, although USEF wouldn’t be comfortable with this description. Afterall, the technologies they develop are for peaceful purposes only. Right?

(I still vividly remember the change in body language when discussing with USEF how accurate USERS’s SEM -see image above- could be made).

Leaving aside the dual-use nature of many USEF projects, ANSARO is a vital component in what METI had been calling its Space on Demand (SOD) program, which, while it doesn’t actually use military language, leves very little to the imagination. Submarine launch, air launch (and with Epsilon) mobile launch! Reprogrammable satellites…”flexible” ground systems (we’ll get to that one in Part III).

Incidentally, the other main submarine space launch vehicle I know of  is the R-29R Vysota “Stingray” SLBM rebranded Volna and its peaceful brotherhood for lobbing payloads into LEO instead of  3x 300 kiloton-yield warheads at…wherever.

Behind this, ASNARO is a platform technology that also enables NEC to supply ISAS with SPRINT-series satellites, and could become a key part of Japan’s ODA strategy to counter China’s building influence in ASEAN. Hitherto, APRSAF has been a bit of a highly amicable talking shop. More about that in Part II.

Anyway, here is the Space News article with some of the bear-bones details. More to follow in Parts II and III.

ASNARO Delayed but far from Doomed!

]]> http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/06/30/asnaro-project-upate-part-i-delayed-but-not-doomed/feed/ 0 http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/06/29/briefing-eurasia-group-on-in-defense-of-japan-on-friday/ http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/2011/06/29/briefing-eurasia-group-on-in-defense-of-japan-on-friday/#comments Wed, 29 Jun 2011 13:21:22 +0000 admin http://indefenseofjapan.com/blog/?p=796 Saadia and I are looking forward to briefing the Eurasia Group on In Defense of Japan, following their invitation for us to follow up on our talk to the Institute for Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple on June 3rd. Many thanks to Robert for that!

The talk at Temple was an outstanding success, with many many questions, and we are still following up. Of particular interest was that Japanese think tanks have started to take notice. As little as two years ago, I feel our talk would have been seen as controversial, but now discussion is deemed acceptable. And so it should be. That was also the point…

This follows on from a favorable review by no less than Foreign Affairs in the January/February 2011 edition.

The review by Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, deputy historian of Air Force Space Command, concludes with the assessment that our book might serve as “a model for historically grounded analyses of other national space policies and programs.”

We hope so, and that was the point.

We felt (and feel) that Japan’s highly successful strategic policy of technonationalism  is very poorly understood, and Japan’s space program is poorly served by mass media and its tropes.

You know the score: when you really know about something, what you read in the mass media about it just often doesn’t  make sense, or contains editorial bias. As a mea culpa, I’m one of the people fundamentally responsible for this when I wrote several dozen articles for Space News back in the late 90′s plotting each twist and turn of some very real technology problems that had surfaced, followed by budget cuts.

Saying that, Time has been a notable exception.

In the age of Twittering and instant recycling of PR,  the need for good, old-fashioned research and sourcing of information becomes ever more important.

There has always been a strong element of “aw-shucks, you don’t say” about the real purpose of the QZSS system, which is to provide a highly advanced (15cm to 1m positioning accuracy) sovereign (encrypted = military signal) positioning (read targeting) local (read regional) GPS system, that’s useful for…the same uses as the original GPS and GLONASS systems.

Although the what become the present system originated out of Melco and the old CRL (Communications Research Laboratory, now NICT) in 1996/7. I can still remember the pitch, and then the huge wrangle between the STA and MOFA with the U.S. over it. I covered this for Space News what, 14 and 13 years ago now.

In a recent conversation I had with a former GSDF general who is now a consultant for a major Japanese IT firm consulting the MOD to fight Japan’s cyberwars against 30,000 state-funded Chinese hackers, making sure QZSS has targeting capability has been formally on the table in inter-ministerial meetings (well at that time the MOD was the JDA) since at least 2005. In fact, retired general “X,” as we’ll call him, brought QZSS up unilaterally. The topic we were discussing was  the utility of UAVs and network-centric warfare and the limits of interoperability. The main issue for X was concern that Japan be capable of building a “rec’n'rocket” Global Hawk capability as well as a tactical capability so that battlefield, operations and strategic roles can be fulfilled. And then, as he put it, “there is the space element” of which QZSS or its successor will no doublt play a role…

2005. 2005. Well, well, well. Wasn’t that  time when the now-defunct ASBC (Advanced Satellite Business Corporation), who were responsible for window-dressing QZSS as an orbital Wall-Mart communications and broadcasting and “man nabi” system, gave me a very 玉虫色 (tamamushiiro) response about if they were talking to the JDA about the QZSS’s dual-uses.

The business model for QZSS as pounded out by ASBC didn’t make sense. Why would we need man-nabi from a keitai with an expensive chip plugged into a space-based system when nabi functions were already commonplace. Why would we need broadcasting when we already had BS* by NHK, and SKY PerfecTV washing our brains out with hundreds of channels of digital junk. SkyPerfect being the consolidated rump of what had been  DirecTV, PerfecTV and JSky B competing in Japan’s limited market, and JSAT competing with Mitsubishi’s SCC as a platform service providers. (SCC lost and was merged into JSAT). So there goes your business model.

As we make clear in In Defense of Japan, “..although the QZSS/Michibiki itself is a product of the 2000s, the system as a whole represents the culmination of eff orts to develop a regional GPS system dating back to the late 1980s.  Like a lot of the other space- based technologies discussed in this book, this one has had a long trajectory…”

More precisely, like everyone else, Japan realized that the space-based force muliplier technology and infrastruture, with gave birth to RMA, completely outdated militaries not similarly equipped in practically anything other than low-intensity conflicts. Thus the gearing up by Europe (Galileo), China (Beidou) (not exactly friends those two with the snooty French keeping the receipe for roast canard separate while the Chinese attempt to spice the whole affair up with illiberal doses of General Tao’s Sauce)  and and Japan (Michibiki) to develop its own PNT capability in case it was denied access or remained dependent on U.S. technology.

In the 1990s, the STA, METI, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), looked to develop a positioning system that would cover a large swathe of Asia, from the Kurile Islands to the north, China to the east, and Guam in the south. In March 1997 the then STA asked what was then NASDA (now JAXA) to move ahead with research into the highly accurate, satellite-mounted atomic clocks needed for a high-precision GPS. This was billed at the time as a matter of “economic security.” As anyone who understands Japan’s nomenclature, “economic security” is a fine bedfellow of “security” and his old chum “national security.”  The facinating story of how Michibiki got developed is summarized in In Defense of Japan. Meanwhile, as my recent story in Space News below tries to make clear, the curtains have been drawn open, and people in Japan are starting to talk about Michibiki’s national security role more openly.

*BS means Broadcasting Satellite in Japan, not “the other” meaning.

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