Category: H-X


Path to the H-X Part II

Earlier we took a look at the development of the improved H-2A/B rocket that is going to “lower costs” for commercial satellites to help the H-2A compete in the global market.

Well that may be true, but the key point about the improvements is that they follow Japan’s traditional approach to technology investment- kaizen. By continually learning and improving, the spin-on for Japan’s ability to put be able to put all sorts of payloads in all sorts of places is the necessary deeper function of the dual-use technonationalist development paradigm that these days you don’t even have to scratch the surface of to expose.

This article looks at the deeper story behind the improved H-2A. Like the Epsilon, development has been pushed out. Unlike the Epsilon, the future potential evolution of the H-series to human rating is quite clear.

The first thing to point out is that the upgrades I wrote about in Space News are a deal less ambitious than those originally planned last September. I the original plans for these through the spring, but they were embargoed. Now they’re to have as a reference.

LE-X and H-X

Anyway, lets step back and take a look at how Japan’s rocket program rose and fell and rose again, the inflection points being the February 21, 1998 (crack in LE-5A cooling chamber, dodgy brazing,) and November 15, 1999 (fatigue failure LE-7A inducer) back-to-back failures of the H-2 and then the November 29, 2003 failure (nozzle erosion, SRB-A) of the H-2A carrying two IGS spy satellites.

It was the failure of the H-2A’s Nissan/Thiokol technology SRB-A that particularly incensed then-SAC Commissioner Iguchi, who slammed his desk in frustration: “We forgot to check the SRB-A!” he exclaimed, and rankled Takeo Kawamura (then MEXT-minister and in-name-only responsible for the cursed booster’s non-separation from the core stage) enough to begin the process of reforming Japan’s space governance- reforms that are just now being resolved by Yamakawa sensei.

We shall overcome indeed.

But since then the H-2A/B have flown with a perfect record, with the H-2B representing a literally huge boost to Japan’s LV integration skills as well as its launch capacity all for a couple of hundred million bucks. Yes, THAT GOOD!

Apart from improvements in nozzles, cavitation, valves and vibration, JAXA and MHI’s continuous kaizen have led to a number of other improvements of other weaknesses, including separating redundancy lines to make them even more robust, and protecting the wire harness, lets never remember that these rockets work as designed and developed at a cost one order lower than their U.S. rivals.

Another one of those failures by Japan’s doomed and disaster-prone space program, right?

Now lets go to the H-X, which is scheduled for development in 2020; the key weapon for this is the LE-X engine, which will use a high-thrust expander bleed cycle engine, making it inherently more safe and robust.

Thrust will be 1450kN, Specific Impulse (vacuum)  432 seconds and the rotational speeds of the FTP and OTP will be 40,800 rpm and 16,100 rpm respectively.  The engine will feature a simplified manifold for the injector, a single-sage open impeller with a two-stage inducer for the fuel turbo pump, a spin-form single sheet metallic nozzle and the oxygen turbo pump will feature a single-stage impeller and a two-stage turbine. Component testing is due to start next year with prototype engine test firing in 2015 and qualification tests beginning in 2017. If everything goes according to plan -a big if of course- then a test flight might be feasible as early as 2018, according to internal JAXA documents.

Will Japan pull it off and be launching a manned H-X in 2020. I don’t think so- there isn’t the will nor the money. Can Japan do it?

You bet!

….First steps halted by lack of budget…

I get sort of incredulous when folks talk about the various failures of Japan’s space development programs to do this and that. The only things Japan’s space development program is guilty of is being inexpensive and successful. Oh No? Shucks. How much did Kounotori cost to develop then, and the H-2B? Burning up time indeed.

Following the Asahi’s punt at describing JAXA’s H-3 rocket earlier this year, I decided to take look at Japan’s steps toward human spaceflight via upgrading the H-2 family. After talking to MHI back in 2005, I didn’t expect too many changes, with the primary new technology driver for the H-3 being the LE-X engine.

Five years later, and things seem to be on the same course, although JAXA is now openly offering its development schedules and plans to those interested and it makes for a great look into the future.

First of all, the fact that JAXA will be embarking on a “Phase I” upgrade this April spurred me to file an article for Space News, which is now below. Initially I’d like to make comments on the missing elements of this story and background that can’t be crammed in a 550-750 word article, and then I’ll move on to future plans in more detail in Part II, which will also show just how advanced thinking is on polishing the space silverware in Japan.

First of all, here is the story, then some follow-up below:

Comments:
Ever since I first started writing on the H-II, with a story on Nissan importing CFRP technology for the  H-2A’s initial SRB-As, what, back in 1997 as I remember, we have been “waiting” for the H-IIA  to fulfill its stated public goal of being “commercially” successful.

Commercially successful. Hehe. What the hell is that supposed to mean? How much taxpayers money has been sunk into the military by Japan’s competitors to produce hardware. Where is the dividing line?

Well I’ve been attacked by some very unpleasant people about my idea that it doesn’t really, really matter if the H-2A is commercially successful or not, because the money will always be found to keep on developing Japan’s liquid (and LNG and solid) propulsion and system’s integration technology, whether the rocket makes a profit in the commercial marketplace or not.

There are several parts to this argument: but my point is that that fundamentally, money will always be found because that’s been essential part of Japan’s technonationalist industrial policy since the Meij Ishin period (see Rich Nation, Strong Army, which forms an essential plank for the arguments in In Defense of Japan).

Beyond the spin-on, spin-off paradigm, and MHI’s long-standing interest in microsatellites, MHI is very keen to get the story about about these upgrades because they show the strong commitment to improving this wonderful system, showcase MHI’s and Japan’s technologies, and well, if the yen were even 120 to the dollar, how cheap would the H-2A be compared to the Atlas anyway?

That’s wishful thinking, but it is a fact that Tanegashima’s issues don’t begin and end with ralicraltant fishing unions who need regular dollops of fiscal and pools of alcoholic lubrication to open up the launch windows.

Locals can be lubed, but the physics of getting a payload into orbit from Southern Japan don’t change no matter how much awamori is consumed. Firstly, the rocket has to take a bit of a long and winding ascent to avoid you name it South East Asian nations who don’t appreciate tons of flaming toxic space debris landing on them should the worst happen. Then, and here’s the spin, Tanegashima is quite a way off the equator meaning the H-2A is loosing out on arrival as well. So the top line is the bottom line and MHI are very keen to point out that the long-cruise capability saves (potential) customers money.

The second point I would like to make is that the upgrade I wrote about is actually a stripped down version. The Epsilon has also been hit. Despite both LVs being high priority, penny pinching means that the improvements to the H-2A and the Epsilon are actually strung out to a different timetable and diluted implementation compared to what even was the consensus for the development pathways as late as last September.

But that is for Part II

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