Archive for 4月, 2011


The more I talk to Morita Sensei about the Epsilon, the more I am struck by how important it is to Japan’s strategic solid-fuel dual-use technology maintenance program. Those of you who know your rockets will know that the last two generations of ISAS sold LVs have been judged as readily convertible to ICBMS, and also the J-1, the last time Japan “mixed ‘n’ matched” technologies from its NASDA derived and ISAS derived programs.

But the Epsilon is very very different. Or is it? Where else other than in Japan could you develop a launch-on-demand rocket/ missile for $200 million? The Epsilon rocks! It is only an extreme budget squeeze that is stopping it from launching in its full configuration in 2013 right away. First of all, here is the article I recently wrote for Space News:

The technical changes being made to develop the Epsilon seem to have fully taken on board and learned from the mistakes made for the J-1 (featuring Tomifumi Godai, about whom I talk more about below), which, in one of my favorite articles for Space News in the 1990s, was “hammered” for its costs after a report by the Management and Coordination Agency showed that the J-1 development program cost more than similar projects in other countries. At the time I could see the mantra; Japan was trying to switch to genuinely be seen to cut costs from practically nothing to vapor, while underneath the J-1 was always mainly a technology development program to see if it could integrate an ICBM from its liquid and solid development programs. In terms of the cost per launch, the J-1 was really quite expensive. But in terms of technically showing how easy it is for Japan to produce ICBMs, the J-1 was quite a piece of work!

Here is the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
assessment of the J-1: 

To jog your memory: the J-1 was a three-stage solid fuel rocket able to place payloads of about 1,000 kg int low Earth orbit and the first NASDA rocket to be made from a  combination of existing indigenous rockets – the solid rocket booster of the H-2 and the upper stage of the M-3S II. In other words, after an awfully long, twisting and tortured route down the J-1U -> J-2 -> GX route, which was basically IHI’s bid to become a liquid engine technology integration company, the Epsilon is the direct successor of the J-1. The Epsilon is what the J-1 should have been.

Does any of this, taken from the Japan Echo of 15 years ago, sound at all similar?

Information Bulletin No.64
First Launch of Cost-Efficient J-1 Rocket Scheduled for February 1996

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January 8,1996

The National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) is in the process of assembling a new domestically produced rocket, the J-1. Scheduled to be launched from the Tanegashima Space Center in February 1996, the J-1 features a cost-efficient design that incorporates parts of existing rockets. It will carry as its payload an experimental space vehicle that will gather data to be used in the development of a Japanese space shuttle, HOPE.
The mainstay of Japan’s space program is today the H-2, the first of which was successfully launched in 1994. The H-2, which can boost a two-ton satellite into geostationary orbit 36,000 kilometers above the equator, is a two-stage rocket fueled by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The J-1, on the other hand, is a three-stage rocket designed to place a satellite of about one ton in low orbit. It was jointly developed by NASDA and the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science with an eye to a likely increase in the demand for rockets to put into low orbit small telecommunications and other satellites.
To save on development and production costs, current plans call for the first J-1 to incorporate the type of solid-fuel rocket now being used by NASDA as boosters for the H-2; the second and third will use a combination of the M23 and M3B sold-fuel rockets that constitute the tip of ISAS’s M-3SII. The J-1, which stands 33 meters tall, measures 1.8 meters in diameter, and weighs 87 tons is rather small compared to the H-2-50 meters tall, 4 meters in diameter, 264 tons-but was developed for only one-ninth of the cost, or 3.1 billion.
The first J-1, scheduled to be launched on February 1, 1996, will carry as its payload the 1,050-kilogram HYFLEX …” [X-37B space bomber test... no no, only joking. It's nothing like the X-37B space bomber at all; here it is landing, right] “…a hypersonic flight experiment vehicle that will collect data for the development of a Japanese space shuttle, named HOPE. HYFLEX will separate from the J-1 at an altitude of 110 kilometers and glide back through the atmosphere. Scientists will be evaluating such points as HYFLEX’s heat-resistant properties as it reaches temperatures as high as 1500-1600 degrees Celsius and its stability and control systems as it hits speeds of up to Mach 15. After completing its glide, the HYFLEX will deploy a parachute and splash down in the ocean near the island of Ogasawara, where it will be retrieved by
waiting ships.

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The wonderful thing about this article is that it shows what they Japanese call the (Kyu) pichi (pitch) or the rapid assault on the higher strategic echelons of space development. It’s hard to believe going back to 1990s with the hubris and triumphalism;  with people like Tomifumi Godai, the godfather of the H-2, regaling Japan for its prowess in building better than the gaijin. The NYT article I linked to, unlike the screed put out these days, is actually worth reading! Godai’s pride in the H-2 was soon deflated though and his triumphalist series of articles in NASDA today in the 1990s has now disappeared from web and written out of history. But I remember.

It’s worth reminding people, I feel, that with a little bit more money, Japan would have had its own automated shuttle by now. It’s not doing too badly as it is with Kounotori, which is itself a technical triumph and a bargain- costing only $200 million or so to develop (officially).

But, literally, Japan lost Hope.  In caffeinated and wilder-eyed moments I often wonder how much pressure was put on Japan to sacrifice its space program on the altar of fiscal restraint when other much more wasteful spending programs survived. (I often marvel at how quickly SmartSat disappeared too…did someone in the U.S. embassy  gently whisper sweet somethings  in NICT’s ear so as not to show up the U.S. or frighten the Chinese too much?)

There is no question that the Epsilon is a highly aggressive dual-use ICBM program that actually will fulfill three functions;

a) It’s stated purpose- to provide a low-cost, highly flexible alternative to the H-2A/B for Japan’s microsatellite and science community and ASNARO/ ODA-programs

b) A fast-flexible mobile launcher for military micro/nano/pico satellites at times of increased tension or the buildup or waging of war. In fact the SPRINT series in itself does a nice job building up a standard bus system for modular payloads, which will make them highly versatile for applications starting with medium resolution/ tactical spy satellites aka ASNARO. The SPRINT-A flight is in fact a test launch for upcoming deals with Vietnam and Cambodia to supply satellites as ODA (and to keep them out of China’s orbit- again literally!)

c) A family of boosters for said purposes (a) and (b) and also as an ICBM design for if/when Japan decide to weaponsize its supergrade / plutonium stocks.

I have also put the first article I published on the Epsilon, which was originally called the ASR here, FYI:

This was one of the more important interviews I had back in the day when I was working on getting Stanford University to try to understand the scale of the changes that were occurring in Japan’s strategic thinking in terms of beginning to show deployment of Japan’s dual-use technologies- when some of the recessed hedge thinking started edging toward…

…let’s put it a different way:- and the dual-use aspect of Japan’s space development strategy started becoming the subject of polite conversation.

Basically the story is that I’d realized it had been on the cards ever since the 1998 “Taepodon flyover,” which Saadia and I call the Taepondon Trigger, when Melco handed me the pre-prepared plans for what were going to become the IGS. Funny, that, wasn’t it?

However, when I pitched to Saadia back in 2003 back in the Okura Hotel’s breakfast bar that Japan was going to militarize its space development, there was concern from her that I was going to go too far too quickly. And our first version of the book in 2005 that predicted what was going to happen (I was about 95% right, if you could put a figure on it, as it turned out) was dismissed out of hand first time round because it didn’t fit the frame. But all I was doing was applying Dick Samuel’s scholarship from beyond the aerospace sector to the space…

First meeting Takeo Kawamura in 2006 was a vital step in plugging into the fundamental changes occurring with the Kawamura Initiative (IDOJ, pp.38) that we documented in In Defense of Japan. Basically I’d gotten a heads up from Kazuto Suzuki, who played a vital role in promoting and drafting one of the key strategic changes in Japan’s normalization, the Basic Law.

Takeo Kawamura is one of those great people that you get to meet in your life who  care about what it means and will take the extra step to put it out. I was there to put the message out to an international audience that someone cared, and he did, and I did, and that was enough. It was a sort of Homer Simpson d’oh moment that started it all.

I remember back in Feb 2004 during one of my many private audiences with Mazakasu Iguchi when he’d told me…you know, they thought they’d checked everything, right down to the last bolt…they’d cleaned out MHI at Nagoya and they were now pristine clean and ready…but Nissan, they’d forgot Nissan. The bloody solid boosters. I can still remember Iguchi Sensei thumping his desk in exasperation.

It was about the same time that Takeo Kawamura, then MEXT Minister, realized he’d been dealt a dud hand. SAC was supposed to be in control of MEXT, or was it CSTP in control of everything? Nobody  really knew. That was the point.  Everybody got blamed, but nobody took the rap. Kawamura realized he was just a figurehead, and that space development was on bureaucratic autopilot. Whatever you felt about Ryutaro Hashimoto at the time, he did really have some sort of guts to try to change things. So Takeo Kawamura stepped up to the plate. The rest is, as you might say, recent history ;-) .

(Scholars have tried to push the idea of the executive taking over from the Kanryo, not realizing that that if they’d seen Yes Prime Minister, they’d know that Sir Humphrey is a two-decade pushover. I’m only half joking!)

It’s really fun to start reporting again, even if it’s only part time. Apart from Space News I haven’t been doing any proper journalism for a decade now so it’s nice to be back riding the bike and developing a beat again after a long, long break.

As I am working more for Defense News these days, I thought I would start putting my articles up. Actually the DN web database doesn’t have a record of my earlier work on J-military space, but from now on I’ll be posting more work up.

The current crossroad is the just the latest installment of a 30-year drama that has been testing the flexibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance. When my Japanese industry sources tell me they really don’t mind building Eurofighter as long as they get the technology transfers and licensed production, I really question how much they are pulling my leg. Would the U.S. really, ever allow Japan not to buy American. Would Japanese companies ever cut their 50-year relationships with their U.S. masters and colleagues and collaborators?

How things have changed; in the days of the Super Sabre, the U.S. happy give Japan even the lathes and and the blueprints and the quality control systems necessary to produce some of the most advanced technologies of the era, thus helping Japan create its machine tool industrial base and then go on to momentarily conquer the world.

But the F-X saga represents another important facet of Japan’s spin-on/off technonationalism promotion policy. In the end, will the lack of 50 planes or 150 planes really serve to tip the balance of peacetime deterrence policies in Asia. Not in the slightest. But getting the technology to build a 5th generation fighter with stealth capabilities is a strategic national issue for Japan.

Boeing, Lockheed, BAE To Vie for Japan's F-X, April 14, 2011

With the Epsilon confirmed for development, Japan’s latest reentry technology experiment appears to have been conducted successfully with the test of  the U.S. Department of Defense’s Re-entry Breakup Recorder (REBR) on Kounotori 2 on March 31.

The DOD's REBR

The DOD's REBR

REBR recorded temperature, acceleration, rotational rate and other data during the  controlled reentry and successfully phoned home that data prior to final impact and was still  transmitting while floating in the ocean. REBR was made possible by using miniature sensors and cell phone technology, built as basically a satellite phone with a heat shield.

REBR’s stated purpose is to collect data during atmospheric reentries of space hardware in order to help understand breakup and increase the safety of such reentries. Of course this data is valuable for a number of dual-use reasons. Let’s not talking about improving the accuracy of warheads for now, however.

The robotic HTV-2 (Kountori-2) is a highly-advanced automatic cargo carrier for the ISS

The REBR project is supported by the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and the Boeing Company. The first flight test of the small, autonomous device was coordinated by the Department of Defense’s Space Test Program which includes highly aggressive military space programs including the Orbital Express program which is dual-use ASAT technology demonstrator, on top of a variety of military microsatellites tested and under development by the STP.

In Japan’s case, REBR  began collecting data,  ultimately detaching from the disintegrating spacecraft and continuing in freefall from approximately 60,000 feet from the ocean. REBR effectively made a “phone call” over about five minutes before landing in the Pacific Ocean.

A second test will be REBR’s reentry aboard the European Autonomous Transfer Vehicle 2, called Johannes Kepler, in early June.

As we pointed out in In Defense of Japan, Japan has made sure to accumulate reentry targeting technology through Hyflex, Express, USERS, and so on as part of its securing the technology option to develop a counterforce strategy based on Epsilon and the ability to develop highly compact, boosted fission warheads based on the country’s supply of supergrade.

Now the gloves appear to be off with JAXA working directly with the DOD.

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