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The decision on the shape of the new space agency (origially called the 宇宙庁) in the original Matsui Plan has been stalled again by last-minute haggling as MEXT mounts a last-ditch battle to stop ceeding budget and programmatic authority to the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, according to Takafumi Matsui, architect of the plan, in an interview yesterday (Tuesday August 9). It was quite spooky to interview Matsui Sensei in the offices of the IIPS in Toranomon knowing that a major bureaucratic battle between MEXT, METI and the CO was taking place a scant 500 meters or so away in Kasumigaseki proper- a battle completely ignored by the mainstream press but covered in Japan’s gutsy shukanzasshi (weeklies).

As I pointed out last week in How will the SHSP’s Next-Gen Space Plan Unfold? August 8 was supposed to be Change You Can Believe In day when the SHSP was to finalize the transfer of power of authority of the QZSS system development to the CO along with the budgetary powers to complete it, largely at the expense of MEXT. According to Matsui Sensei, MEXT is going down fighting and it is unclear whether the deal will go through.

As I pointed out last time,   June 30′s  政府の宇宙開発利用体制の在り方について(案) represents a compromise- originally the 宇宙庁 was to have complete control of space policy and budget, but according to Matsui Sensei, it represents a stealth-step in the right direction. If the plan works, then the CO will have seized control of Japan’s largest ever space infrastructure project, involving the building of a 7 or 8 satellite constellation of Michibiki satellites that will provide sub-1 meter positioning and emergency communications and as yet undisclosed (to be worked out- nothing sinister) functions.

For those of you familiar with the QZSS project, the CO taking charge is both a practical solution and a master stroke all at once, removing the in-fighting that has plagued the project for the best part of a decade and firmly putting the CO in charge of space national security and public infrastructure.

Meanwhile the General Space Activities budget is due for a savage beating, with the DPJ trying to enforce a 30% cut in some science and technology fighting. The Basic Plan for Space Policy of June 2009- take a look at page 8,  looks to have been reduced to administrative 瓦礫 (gareki= rubble).

To see how things pan out, watch this space!

 

In China’s Search for a Grand Strategy (Foreign Affairs・March/April 2011), Wang Jisi, who is Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University, is obviously the chosen point man to present the kinder, gentler “it’s gonna be OK, don’t worry, be happy” face of China to the rest of us.

One of Wang’s primary arguments for explaining away China’s belligerence on the high sees, see for example the harassment of USNS Impeccable in international waters being one of the more minor incidents, is the need of the Chinese leadership to pander to the rabid nationalism it has created. In a country where free political debate is censored, nationalism is one of the few outlets. Now this monster has been released it must be pacified, leading to public hyperventilation and hyperbole and adolescent bullying on the seas.

Tuesday’s release of Japan’s 37th White Paper however gets to grips with the real issue at hand- China’s claims to sovereign rights and ju­risdiction over its Exclusive Economic Zone.  This key issue is a recipe for disaster. Coping with it will be a major task in hand for the U.S.-Japan Alliance until China implodes.

The story remains the same…

In any case, here is the full article:

By PAUL KALLENDER-UMEZU TOKYO — Japan’s new defense white paper hints at an expecta­tion of long-term declines in U.S. military and economic strength and reflects an unprecedented level of concern about China.

“China’s future actions are wor­risome, given what can be inter­preted as its overbearing ways to address its clashing interests with neighboring countries, in­cluding Japan,” says the Aug. 2 paper by the Ministry of Defense (MoD), titled “Defense of Japan 2011.” Chinese government officials were quick to respond in Japan­ese media reports. Ma Zhaoxu, a spokesman for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized “irre­sponsible comments,” while Chi­nese Defense Ministry spokesman Geng Yansheng accused Japan of deliberately exaggerating a “Chi­na threat.” At issue is the Japanese word “koatsuteki,” which can also be translated as “assertive,” and is used in an unofficial translation of the white paper to describe Japan’s concerns about China’s military modernization and ex­panding maritime reach, said Jun Okumura, adviser at the Eurasia Group here.

“The MoD merely said what everyone had on their minds,” Okumura said. “The Chinese side responded in kind.” Okumura said Tokyo would be remiss not to comment on recent provocations by the Chinese Navy, including multiple incur­sions into Japanese territorial waters by destroyers and nu­clear-powered submarines, and the “buzzing” of vessels and airspace. All this comes after China’s 20-year military buildup and a quadrupling of military spending in the last decade.

Analysts said much of the paper’s language and approach echo longstanding themes: It calls the U.S. Japan alliance “indispensable,” warns of cyber attacks, and so on.

“It is very much in line with what you would expect in a year with a revised NDPG,” the National Defense Program Guidelines released in December, said Christopher Hughes, a professor of interna­tional politics and Japanese studies at Britain’s University of Warwick.

But the paper also mentions a “global shift in the balance of power” — code for potential long-term U.S. military and eco­nomic decline.

A reference to territorial disputes, though brief, is ominous, according to Pe­ter Woolley, a professor of comparative politics at Fairleigh Dickinson University in New Jersey.

“Japan is geographically surrounded by water and has a long coastline and numer­ous islands,” Woolley said. “Invasion of these islands can be anticipated as one form of armed attack. Any Japanese reader knows very well that the retreat of U.S. in­fluence, to be replaced by that of new ac­tors, is problematic and complex for Japan.” South Korea is complaining about Tokyo’s claims on the Sea of Japan islands that Seoul calls Dokdo.

The paper also notes that China plans to expand its maritime activities. That reflects growing Japanese and U.S. concern about Beijing’s claims to sovereign rights and ju­risdiction over its Exclusive Economic Zone, said James Manicom, a naval expert at Cana­da’s Balsillie School of International Affairs. “I don’t think the tone is that surprising,” Manicom said. “The most important differ­ence as it relates to maritime issues is the addition of China’s interpretation of inter­national law as a subject of concern.” The paper reflects concern about North Korea’s new Musudan ballistic missile, which can hit Guam, and other threats, said Alessio Patalano, an expert on Japanese mil­itary issues at Kings College, London.

“The sinking of the Cheonan, the artillery shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, China’s air­craft and carrier programs, are other exam­ples. Japan’s response was clear and sought to underline the potential risk presented by the missile programs of North Korea, and by China’s evolving behavior at sea,” Patalano said.

The paper also contains a 13-page section on the March 11 Great East Japan Earth­quake, lauding the U.S. response that in­cluded about 16,000 troops, 15 vessels and 140 aircraft.

The aid operation “looms large because it is important to a beleaguered Japanese pub­lic, because Japan is genuinely grateful and prepared to say so,” Woolley said.

Monday is the day when the the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP) is due to release its report on which part of the government is going to lead Japan’s space policy and budgeting. The decisions announced Monday, more than a year later than intended and the result of a 30-month bureaubattle between MEXT and the Cabinet Office and METI, will give important clues as to how successful MEXT’s rearguard action to save its programmatic and budget control against encroachment by the CO and METI has been.

Despite bitter complaints about stacked committees and placements (oh it pains me not to write about them) showing that Japanese bureaucratic battles can be just as downright dirty and corrupt as a Brooklyn Ward (or British Borough) election, MEXT would seem to have done pretty well out of it so far. Remember, back in 2008 the Basic Law’s key point was to, within 2 years, have the SHSP design a Cabinet-led 宇宙庁 (Space Agency) focused on promoting the use of space for national security, applications and industrialization- all anathema to MEXT, which has maintained control of around 60% of the entire space budget through its control of the R&D oriented JAXA.

With an attitude similar to that of Charlton Heston at the NRA, or perhaps, more like that of Jim Hacker defending the great British Sausage, in an astonishing achievement revelead in June 30′s 政府の宇宙開発利用体制の在り方について(案) 平成23年6月30日 MEXT has managed to whittle down the SHSP’s proposal to taking about 30% of its budget.

Why astonishing? Well the whole point of the Basic Space Law (宇宙基本法(骨子) was to rip the power away from MEXT in the first place (see several dozen of my articles in Space News down the years), in particular, fight the 今後の宇宙政策の在り方に関する 有識者会議 提言書 put together by Matsui Sensei, which de facto proposed a revolution in space organization, and did so in only 5 pages. Can you imagine something so beautifully clear and direct as to delineate a major Japanese governmental powerbroking revolution in ONLY FIVE PAGES?

No wonder it wasn’t popular! Here is the original article I wrote about the Matsui initiative, arranged by Seiji Maehara to put the cat among the pigeons. We’ll see how things pan out on Monday.

The Matsui Report was not popular with MEXT but popular with METI...

It’s cheap journalism to say that the battle between the F-35 and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet is heating up, because it’s only heating up in the press- the battle has been heating up between Lockheed Martin and Boeing for some time. After talking to people very familiar with what is going on, it does seem as budget pressures are putting a new sheen on the previously unfancied Super Hornet.

Let’s backtrack a few years. Ever since the tsunami of kokusanka in aerospace collided, broke, and ebbed on the impenetrable need to maintain good offices with the U.S.  in the FSX crisis (as told so well by Michael Green in Arming Japan, p.86-107 ) Japan’s aerospace ambitions long ago turned back to Meiji priorities- get the best technology in the world available and indigenize it.

The current war of words between the F-35 and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and, indeed, the Eurofighter- which has many champions here among impartial observers- speaks volumes to the shifting and juggling of priorities facing Japanese planners.

Japan’s instinct was to have bought the F-22  and its stealth technology and pressed for squeezing as much technology and production transfer out of the U.S. as possible. A vain hope and crushed painfully.

The F-35 has been seen as the “next best thing” as it is a “5th generation” airframe that is stealthy and has all its weapons, fuel tanks and etc. subsumed into the airframe. But the F-35 has been fighting terrible battles of its own (see The Economist’s The last manned fighter for more details) with well publicized software and more serious difficulties and potentially soaring per-unit costs. Which is what made my private interview with former Top Gun pilot and now F-35 Program Manager Stephen O’Bryan (below) even more important.

The critical issues are always balancing cost (especially expensive local production) vs. technology transfer (and assuaging/ pushback against U.S. technonationalism), vs. jobs for MHI and KHI, vs. maintaining the Alliance all balanced by the fact that unless Japan purchases top-of-the-line fighters, it probably sends terrible signals to the Chinese.

Bearing all this in mind, the really astonishing thing is the distance the Super Hornet has traveled over the past year or so in perception. Three years ago it was assumed this plane, based on a 40-year-old design, wouldn’t stand a chance against the F-35. Again there are faint echos of the FSX saga again. Back in the day Japan felt forced to drop its preference for the original F-18, in which TDRI could fit all sorts of cool J-gear such as CCV, composite wings and phased array radar, for the F-16 because of the increasing arrogance of McDonnell Douglas, which insisted on blocking any Japanese improvements on the plane without paying MD first…

How times have changed. With U.S. industry in fear of reduced procurement until the U.S. finds more clients to arm or wars to fight, Lockheed Martin and Boeing seem to be falling over themselves to offer better and better deals.

“There is a clear sense that improvements have been made and that from an industrial point of view F-35 will be a much better deal than one would have thought in the past. And that to me sounds like they’re trying to outbid the Europeans, because they are those offering access to technology know-how,” says my good friend Alessio Patalano over at Kings College, London.

Despite clouds remaining over the actual cost and operability of the F-35 Patalano thinks it would be a major mistake to opt for the F/A-18E because it’s cheap. Purchases like this RFP are actually tools of statecraft and in the fast evolving East Asian landscape, Japan needs to maintain a modern, advanced air force, one capable of measuring itself up against modernising regional forces, both operationally and technically, he says.

Anyway, here is the original article. Enjoy!

F-18 Gains Favor in Japan’s F-X Contest By Paul Kallender-Umezu, Defense News, July 25, 2011, page 6

Following on from an afternoon at NEC a while back, I was also fortunate enough to spend more or less a day at USEF catching up on METI’s space programs. What an eye-opening event that was, which will also mean that an entire chapter in an upcoming book and old friend and I are planning is now almost entirely focused on USEF. Space Environment Reliability Verification Integrated System SERVIS-2 for example yielded at least one internationally competitive technology that has become a major global success story, as well as building significant leaps forward in satellite design with the improved CFRP core and 3D heat pipes…on Melco’s COTs-testbed the SERVIS-1.

Anyway, back to the matter in hand: in promoting the ASNARO/Nextar project, USEF took a break from Melco, which has been the main beneficiary of spin on/off with USEF over the last 15 years, to switch to NEC, which had traditionally been- and still is- Japan’s master of smaller bus systems, communications and sensors. I have to qualify this statement by saying that when I mean small, I don’t mean the micro- nano- and picosatellites now being churned out by UNISEC members and others.

What I mean is NEC’s excellence in satellites such as Oicets/Kirari and work done for ISAS over the decasdes. Allied with the engineering tradition of Toshiba (in particular ETS-7 here is an old story and another here I did for Spacer and ETS-6), NEC should have by all accounts bounced back earlier from last decade’s scandal.

But they are back, big time with the small-medium ASNARO bus (see below graphic):

Back in the late 90s, as I mentioned in Part-I, NEC’s main challenge for the then-commercial constellation communications market was the Oicets bus for Teledesic.

Remember Skybridge, Celestri, Spaceway, Astrolink, and the rest of them?…how could we ever forget the time when it appeared the earth was about to be circled by hundreds of satellites dedicated to making our brick cellphones work so expensively…

That all went kaput, along with NEC’s credibility when the procurement scandal broke in 1998, all to conveniently sabotaging NEC’s bid for the IGS constellation. And it seemed for years that NEC had been cast adrift like Comets/ Kakehashi or Kiku-6 slowly frazzling in the radiation of bad publicity while sinking into a black hole of no major Engineering Test Satellite contracts for JAXA.

In many ways, with the seizure of the IGS contracts by Melco in 1998, the company surged ahead of NEC, which was left without heavy bus technology. With Melco also closely aligned to USEF, things were looking pretty grim for NEC which seemed to have been left behind from securing major contracts for NASDA/JAXA for the best part of a decade.

NEC’s position has turned the corner and improved by several developments, however.  

First miniturization and continual technical improvement mean that relatively small buses such as ASNARO’s can do a lot more than they could 20 years ago. These days, a middleweight can pack the punch of a heavyweight of yesteryear in some respects.  Related to this, there is swing back to the need for smaller, more flexible satellites as payloads and technology has advanced and ASNARO’s modular, plug and play capabilities could work just fine.

Second, more and differnet satellites are needed from multiple sources to build more solutions for Japan’s emerging national security space infrastructure.  Even with Melco recently announcing it planned to redouble its output at its Kamakura Works, Japan needs NEC.

Last but most importantly in some respects is the need for different solutions to promote Japanese space diplomacy in Asia, and South East Asia through APRSAF and ODA and against the rival Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization and CGWIC . Exploring this and related issues will be a key theme for my Ph.D. research at 慶應義塾大学 政策・メディア研究科 (Keio University’s Graduate School of Media and Governance).

In the coming decade, Southeast Asia needs to take decisions about developing its space infrastructure for human security and disaster and environmental warning/monitoring/relief and it’s vital that these are done with Japanese technologies, moving on from the Sentinel, SAFE, STAR and Micro-Star and PLATFORM  programs. And ASNARO/Nextar is just the sort of “platform” required. For more on this, see Part III (to come).  

Veteran satellite journalist Peter J. Brown has just written a nice review of In Defense of Japan on his new blog Japanese in Space.

One of the issues with In Defense of Japan is that it is not media friendly and not designed to be media friendly as we wanted to reach decision makers and analysts. Undoing misconceptions of Japan’s space program by decades of superficial coverage can’t be done by engaging the mass media as the message just does not jive, or jars with media  shibboleths. However, we are finding that people who are seriously interested in this area find the time to read In Defense of Japan through and “get” our arguments.

Peter’s take amounts to: “…this  writer is hard pressed indeed to identify any recent book in English  that comes close to covering as much ground as this one does.”

Here is an excerpt:

Review of In Defense of Japan by Peter J Brown


Many thanks Peter and keep up the good work on Japanese in Space!

ASNARO Project Upate: Part I

USERS SEM Deorbiting Pod

I was lucky enough recently to spend a day interviewing great people at METI, USEF, Pasco and NEC a little while back and managed to nail down many more details about what is happening with the ASNARO (Advanced Satellite with New system Architecture for Observation) project. For some Space News background on ASNARO, please see my original story. This time, specifically METI asked me to write about it for them, and gave tremendous help getting NEC and Pasco on board. It was just wonderful meeting people with ideas and strategies that are obviously well thought out.

Let’s get the disclaimer out of the way first.

From where we are standing, from the point of view of national security space, at the end of the day, it doesn’t matter if NEC succeeds in its strategy to turn the ASNARO/Nextar branded modular satellite platform into a commercial success in/for ASEAN countries. Of course it matters to NEC, because they are a private company and want to make more profit.

And of course it matters to me, because for the health of NEC and Japan’s military industrial base, it’s better that they sell or get more SE Asian nations to “buy” them through ODA and I wish them every luck.

But, at the end of the day, IF ASNARO/Sasuke/ Nextar never makes a successful commercial go of it, the Japanese government is still going to make sure the platform is built. And we predict that ASNARO will play its role in Japan’s emerging national space security infrastructure.

ASNARO is crucial to a number of players in a number of ways. After years of false starts and what may have been blind alleys — MDS-1 Tsubasa or OICETS Kirari spring to mind ;-) -

-Nextar represents what NEC has been trying to build since the late 90s (1998 if my memory serves me right, see NEC unveils prototype bus, aims for Teledesic, this being the non-Space News version) and the era of Hiroaki Shimayama and Takenori Yanase. Nextar, which looks suspiciously like a reworked OICETS/ MDS bus to me, and it’s the keystone of their pan-Asian commercial turnkey systems strategy.

We’ll go into this in Part II.  In Part III, we’ll look at the military angle, but only when the official article is published in Defense News.

So what is ASNARO?

ASNARO is a USEF powerplay to develop a bus system that on one hand will give NEC a chance to compeat in the ASEAN market for EO sats, and whether or not that succeeds, gives Japan the option to build a constellation of spysatellites, all kicked of with a tiny down-payment of 6 billion yen.

Therefore ASNARO is important to METI to show that its decades-long investment in creating standardized satelite bus systems and plug and play and COTs parts at USEF is finally paying off. Those of you  who have read In Defense of Japan know that we more or less regard USEF as METI’s DARPA, or military space arm, although USEF wouldn’t be comfortable with this description. Afterall, the technologies they develop are for peaceful purposes only. Right?

(I still vividly remember the change in body language when discussing with USEF how accurate USERS’s SEM -see image above- could be made).

Leaving aside the dual-use nature of many USEF projects, ANSARO is a vital component in what METI had been calling its Space on Demand (SOD) program, which, while it doesn’t actually use military language, leves very little to the imagination. Submarine launch, air launch (and with Epsilon) mobile launch! Reprogrammable satellites…”flexible” ground systems (we’ll get to that one in Part III).


Incidentally, the other main submarine space launch vehicle I know of  is the R-29R Vysota “Stingray” SLBM rebranded Volna and its peaceful brotherhood for lobbing payloads into LEO instead of  3x 300 kiloton-yield warheads at…wherever.

Behind this, ASNARO is a platform technology that also enables NEC to supply ISAS with SPRINT-series satellites, and could become a key part of Japan’s ODA strategy to counter China’s building influence in ASEAN. Hitherto, APRSAF has been a bit of a highly amicable talking shop. More about that in Part II.

Anyway, here is the Space News article with some of the bear-bones details. More to follow in Parts II and III.

Space News article by Paul Kallender-Umezu

ASNARO Delayed but far from Doomed!

Saadia and I are looking forward to briefing the Eurasia Group on In Defense of Japan, following their invitation for us to follow up on our talk to the Institute for Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple on June 3rd. Many thanks to Robert for that!

The talk at Temple was an outstanding success, with many many questions, and we are still following up. Of particular interest was that Japanese think tanks have started to take notice. As little as two years ago, I feel our talk would have been seen as controversial, but now discussion is deemed acceptable. And so it should be. That was also the point…

Saadia and I were complimented indeed to have In Defense of Japan reviewed by no less than U.S. Space Command’s High Frontier Journal.

This follows on from a favorable review by no less than Foreign Affairs in the January/February 2011 edition.

The review by Dr. Rick W. Sturdevant, deputy historian of Air Force Space Command, concludes with the assessment that our book might serve as “a model for historically grounded analyses of other national space policies and programs.”

We hope so, and that was the point.

We felt (and feel) that Japan’s highly successful strategic policy of technonationalism  is very poorly understood, and Japan’s space program is poorly served by mass media and its tropes.

You know the score: when you really know about something, what you read in the mass media about it just often doesn’t  make sense, or contains editorial bias. As a mea culpa, I’m one of the people fundamentally responsible for this when I wrote several dozen articles for Space News back in the late 90′s plotting each twist and turn of some very real technology problems that had surfaced, followed by budget cuts.

Saying that, Time has been a notable exception.

In the age of Twittering and instant recycling of PR,  the need for good, old-fashioned research and sourcing of information becomes ever more important.

After 15 years and twists and turns that made IHI/Nissan’s bid for the J-1A->J-2->GX look like a skip around the block, Michibiki will finally become an openly accepted part of Japan’s emergent space-based national security structure.

There has always been a strong element of “aw-shucks, you don’t say” about the real purpose of the QZSS system, which is to provide a highly advanced (15cm to 1m positioning accuracy) sovereign (encrypted = military signal) positioning (read targeting) local (read regional) GPS system, that’s useful for…the same uses as the original GPS and GLONASS systems.

Although the what become the present system originated out of Melco and the old CRL (Communications Research Laboratory, now NICT) in 1996/7. I can still remember the pitch, and then the huge wrangle between the STA and MOFA with the U.S. over it. I covered this for Space News what, 14 and 13 years ago now.

In a recent conversation I had with a former GSDF general who is now a consultant for a major Japanese IT firm consulting the MOD to fight Japan’s cyberwars against 30,000 state-funded Chinese hackers, making sure QZSS has targeting capability has been formally on the table in inter-ministerial meetings (well at that time the MOD was the JDA) since at least 2005. In fact, retired general “X,” as we’ll call him, brought QZSS up unilaterally. The topic we were discussing was  the utility of UAVs and network-centric warfare and the limits of interoperability. The main issue for X was concern that Japan be capable of building a “rec’n'rocket” Global Hawk capability as well as a tactical capability so that battlefield, operations and strategic roles can be fulfilled. And then, as he put it, “there is the space element” of which QZSS or its successor will no doublt play a role…

2005. 2005. Well, well, well. Wasn’t that  time when the now-defunct ASBC (Advanced Satellite Business Corporation), who were responsible for window-dressing QZSS as an orbital Wall-Mart communications and broadcasting and “man nabi” system, gave me a very 玉虫色 (tamamushiiro) response about if they were talking to the JDA about the QZSS’s dual-uses.

The business model for QZSS as pounded out by ASBC didn’t make sense. Why would we need man-nabi from a keitai with an expensive chip plugged into a space-based system when nabi functions were already commonplace. Why would we need broadcasting when we already had BS* by NHK, and SKY PerfecTV washing our brains out with hundreds of channels of digital junk. SkyPerfect being the consolidated rump of what had been  DirecTV, PerfecTV and JSky B competing in Japan’s limited market, and JSAT competing with Mitsubishi’s SCC as a platform service providers. (SCC lost and was merged into JSAT). So there goes your business model.

As we make clear in In Defense of Japan, “..although the QZSS/Michibiki itself is a product of the 2000s, the system as a whole represents the culmination of eff orts to develop a regional GPS system dating back to the late 1980s.  Like a lot of the other space- based technologies discussed in this book, this one has had a long trajectory…”

More precisely, like everyone else, Japan realized that the space-based force muliplier technology and infrastruture, with gave birth to RMA, completely outdated militaries not similarly equipped in practically anything other than low-intensity conflicts. Thus the gearing up by Europe (Galileo), China (Beidou) (not exactly friends those two with the snooty French keeping the receipe for roast canard separate while the Chinese attempt to spice the whole affair up with illiberal doses of General Tao’s Sauce)  and and Japan (Michibiki) to develop its own PNT capability in case it was denied access or remained dependent on U.S. technology.

In the 1990s, the STA, METI, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), looked to develop a positioning system that would cover a large swathe of Asia, from the Kurile Islands to the north, China to the east, and Guam in the south. In March 1997 the then STA asked what was then NASDA (now JAXA) to move ahead with research into the highly accurate, satellite-mounted atomic clocks needed for a high-precision GPS. This was billed at the time as a matter of “economic security.” As anyone who understands Japan’s nomenclature, “economic security” is a fine bedfellow of “security” and his old chum “national security.”  The facinating story of how Michibiki got developed is summarized in In Defense of Japan. Meanwhile, as my recent story in Space News below tries to make clear, the curtains have been drawn open, and people in Japan are starting to talk about Michibiki’s national security role more openly.

*BS means Broadcasting Satellite in Japan, not “the other” meaning.

Interesting news a little while back with Lockheed Martin in town to get the F-35 Lightening-II RFP on track for Japan’s F-X.

First of all, here is an earlier story  Boeing, Lockheed, BAE To Vie for Japan’s F-X I filed about the F-X procurement, which lays out some of the key issues.

Speaking to Japan F-35 Campaign Director John Balderston, it was truly impressive to see photos of the F-35 test flying, and the production line; the key message being whatever else you may have read, the F-35 is one hot flying machine.

Balderston’s message was three-fold about the F-35: sure, the program was re-scheduled, and it’s a complex machine, but he promised should Japan choose the F-35, LM will do its best to deliver by 2016, for an average price of $65 million- well below some of the costs we’ve seen, and local production. But, as I said in my article for Defense News below, there is a catch. My sources in Japan say that MHI really doesn’t mind which plane they build, as long as they get work.

However the deeper issue is technology transfer. Lockheed Martin seem to be offering more that just final assembly, but they are stopping short of licensed production. While MHI sees production here as critical to keep its military aerospace business going, strategically, Japan needs and wants in on the F-35′s stealth technology since the U.S. has already roped off the F-22.

A clue as to what sort of agreement might be the starting point for talks is here.

Of course behind that is the spin-on issue: as readers of Dick Samuels will know, Japan’s aerospace industry was rebuilt on the F-86 and T-33 with Lockheed supplying the machine tools  to MHI and KHI (in fact the for the F-86 over 2,000 separate tool designs were transferred) that gave Japan its statistical quality control systems. (And a lot of great stories by one of my heroes, Chuck Yeager!)

Meanwhile Eurofighter and Boeing both have great offerings. If we forget that Japan feels it needs what is the highest technology solution to show China it means business, and that alliance issues mean that buying the F-35 will be the most comfortable diplomatic solution, the Eurofighter and Super Hornet can both fulfill Japan’s defense needs. BAE tell me that this RFP has been excellent- open and transparent and because of this, BAE and Boeing both feel that they are in with a fighting chance.

Anyway, here is the article I filed a few weeks back.

Slow-Fast Boat to China…

Japan's Senkaku Islands
Any more attempts to land troops on the Senkakus will be dealt with

Amid news that Japan is reinforcing its guard of its southern Island chain on top of the countermeasures already announced in the quinquennial 防衛計画の大綱 (National Defense Program Guidelines) of last Dec. 17, (remember in 2005 Japan actually decided to say what everyone knows, and this last time it basically said “hands off”!) NIDS recently came out with an excellent, authoritative report on China’s intentions, in particular in dealing with the increasingly irritating and aggressive actions by PLAN. The report was remarkable in not only its tone and quality, but also in the way it simply denuded the flash-bang ,low-level noise- the irritating buzz of noisy neighbors – with a calm and intelligent response.

Imagine a rather overwrought adolescent bully who is still unsure of himself being told to pipe down by the adult next door. This was the way I read the report- but then again I am biased in favor of Japan! Most of what has happened in the last 6 weeks has reaffirmed my basic faith in Japan as first-rate country full of decent, kind people.

Saying that, appearances can be deceptive. Bashing and passing and missing Japan by the meeja serve various purposes for both sides. Regardless of the media tropes  -good or bad-  Japan has mastered the art of looking weak while while keeping a 木刀 in the corner just in case. Take a look at the massive strengthening of the fleet has been hidden by allotting the tonnage to the Coast Guard, which is for all intents as Dick Samuels says, a fourth branch of armed services now (see “New Fighting Power!” Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,  International Security, Vol 32, No.3, (Winter 2007/8) pp. 84-112). The JCG has:

  • Patrol Vessels: 121
  • Patrol craft: 234
  • Special guard and rescue craft: 63

Aircraft

The JCG operates 73 aircraft, these include:

  • Fixed Wing 27
  • Helicopters 46

…in other words, in 2005, the JSG’s muscle was more than 60% of the total tonnage of China’s surface fleet, including nearly 100 x 500 ton armed patrol ships  including 50 x 1,000-ton class patrol ships. The JCG’s most powerful ships run at 95 meters long include 40 mm cannon and are about two-thirds the size of the MSDF’s Hatsuyuki-class destroyers.

Now Japan is talking in terms of carrier wars. But Japan? Weak, second-string aging incompetent crisis ridden sclerotic Japan involved in carrier wars?

The 30 PLs with helicopter pads and the 69 large PLs without helicopter pads include the Shikishima PLH, which displaces 6,500 tons, is 150 meters long, and has a range of 37,00 kilometers. Rapidly refitting these up to becoming major engines of defense and or destruction has probably never occurred to anyone anywhere. Right.

The point of the report by NIDS is that the bully is maturing and learning how to be more sneaky and less clumsy, and his smaller neighbors are going to need to club together to contain him. Here is my official take on the report:

Defense News April 25, 2011

Path to the H-X Part II

Earlier we took a look at the development of the improved H-2A/B rocket that is going to “lower costs” for commercial satellites to help the H-2A compete in the global market.

Well that may be true, but the key point about the improvements is that they follow Japan’s traditional approach to technology investment- kaizen. By continually learning and improving, the spin-on for Japan’s ability to put be able to put all sorts of payloads in all sorts of places is the necessary deeper function of the dual-use technonationalist development paradigm that these days you don’t even have to scratch the surface of to expose.

This article looks at the deeper story behind the improved H-2A. Like the Epsilon, development has been pushed out. Unlike the Epsilon, the future potential evolution of the H-series to human rating is quite clear.

The first thing to point out is that the upgrades I wrote about in Space News are a deal less ambitious than those originally planned last September. I the original plans for these through the spring, but they were embargoed. Now they’re to have as a reference.

LE-X and H-X

Anyway, lets step back and take a look at how Japan’s rocket program rose and fell and rose again, the inflection points being the February 21, 1998 (crack in LE-5A cooling chamber, dodgy brazing,) and November 15, 1999 (fatigue failure LE-7A inducer) back-to-back failures of the H-2 and then the November 29, 2003 failure (nozzle erosion, SRB-A) of the H-2A carrying two IGS spy satellites.

It was the failure of the H-2A’s Nissan/Thiokol technology SRB-A that particularly incensed then-SAC Commissioner Iguchi, who slammed his desk in frustration: “We forgot to check the SRB-A!” he exclaimed, and rankled Takeo Kawamura (then MEXT-minister and in-name-only responsible for the cursed booster’s non-separation from the core stage) enough to begin the process of reforming Japan’s space governance- reforms that are just now being resolved by Yamakawa sensei.

We shall overcome indeed.

But since then the H-2A/B have flown with a perfect record, with the H-2B representing a literally huge boost to Japan’s LV integration skills as well as its launch capacity all for a couple of hundred million bucks. Yes, THAT GOOD!

Apart from improvements in nozzles, cavitation, valves and vibration, JAXA and MHI’s continuous kaizen have led to a number of other improvements of other weaknesses, including separating redundancy lines to make them even more robust, and protecting the wire harness, lets never remember that these rockets work as designed and developed at a cost one order lower than their U.S. rivals.

Another one of those failures by Japan’s doomed and disaster-prone space program, right?

Now lets go to the H-X, which is scheduled for development in 2020; the key weapon for this is the LE-X engine, which will use a high-thrust expander bleed cycle engine, making it inherently more safe and robust.

Thrust will be 1450kN, Specific Impulse (vacuum)  432 seconds and the rotational speeds of the FTP and OTP will be 40,800 rpm and 16,100 rpm respectively.  The engine will feature a simplified manifold for the injector, a single-sage open impeller with a two-stage inducer for the fuel turbo pump, a spin-form single sheet metallic nozzle and the oxygen turbo pump will feature a single-stage impeller and a two-stage turbine. Component testing is due to start next year with prototype engine test firing in 2015 and qualification tests beginning in 2017. If everything goes according to plan -a big if of course- then a test flight might be feasible as early as 2018, according to internal JAXA documents.

Will Japan pull it off and be launching a manned H-X in 2020. I don’t think so- there isn’t the will nor the money. Can Japan do it?

You bet!

Alos/ Daichi Winks Off

So ALOS/Daichi, NEC’s prototype spy satellite, went AWOL late last month with undisclosed (as yet, to me) electric problems that may or may not be connected to ADEOS-I and -II, IGS and DRTS… I say no more.

Some might say it couldn’t have come at a worse time for Japan as Daichi was providing data on several hundred kilometers of devastated Pacific coastal Tohoku coastline and ALOS-2/ Daichi-2 won’t be launched for another two years or so, according to JAXA.

ALOS/Daichi at work...

Here is the quick brief I put up on Space News/ Spacenews.com on the day of the announcement, also below, with some commentary to follow.

ALOS/Daichi has always presented a bit of an enigma to me. Sources told me back in the 1990s that there were ideas to take the Panchromatic Remote-sensing Instrument for Stereo Mapping (PRISM) sensor by NEC to much higher resolution- to around 1-meter-  but that this was seen as politically difficult at the time. Had Japan done it, it would have been accused of building a spy satellite under the guise of scientific research.

…So resolution was left at 2.5 meters so as not to be accused of being dual-use, but also to provide an intermediate step toward militarily useful resolution. At the same time, its relatively high data storage and transmission capability and stability were also also seen as crucial steps towards building spy satellites.

NEC, like Melco, had its own plans for an operable-LEO based spy satellite constellation based on its small-medium bus system that has an interesting place in Japan’s space history. In a story that made front page news in Space News- contained the claim that the bus was aimed at Teledesic no less. The guy who made the claim, Takenori Yanase,  was just on the edge of the massive defense padding scandal that landed him and Hiroaki Shimayama on the the front page of the newspapers and then jail. I can still remember the NEC flack ringing me up and laughing down the phone- “Hey Paul, your buddies are on the front page of the Nikkei!”

Oh..and then quel surprise!

Within 10 days of the August 31, 1998 Taepodon Trigger, Ichiro Taniguchi was up before the Cabinet briefing them on Melco’s own spy satellite plans- which…required fitting modified PRISM sensors on them to achieve, albeit rather blurrily as it turned out, sort-of 1-meter resolution. :-)

And so what happened to NEC’s small/medium bus technology development for “Earth observation” satellites? The answer is…. ASNARO!

The more I talk to Morita Sensei about the Epsilon, the more I am struck by how important it is to Japan’s strategic solid-fuel dual-use technology maintenance program. Those of you who know your rockets will know that the last two generations of ISAS sold LVs have been judged as readily convertible to ICBMS, and also the J-1, the last time Japan “mixed ‘n’ matched” technologies from its NASDA derived and ISAS derived programs.

But the Epsilon is very very different. Or is it? Where else other than in Japan could you develop a launch-on-demand rocket/ missile for $200 million? The Epsilon rocks! It is only an extreme budget squeeze that is stopping it from launching in its full configuration in 2013 right away. First of all, here is the article I recently wrote for Space News:

The technical changes being made to develop the Epsilon seem to have fully taken on board and learned from the mistakes made for the J-1 (featuring Tomifumi Godai, about whom I talk more about below), which, in one of my favorite articles for Space News in the 1990s, was “hammered” for its costs after a report by the Management and Coordination Agency showed that the J-1 development program cost more than similar projects in other countries. At the time I could see the mantra; Japan was trying to switch to genuinely be seen to cut costs from practically nothing to vapor, while underneath the J-1 was always mainly a technology development program to see if it could integrate an ICBM from its liquid and solid development programs. In terms of the cost per launch, the J-1 was really quite expensive. But in terms of technically showing how easy it is for Japan to produce ICBMs, the J-1 was quite a piece of work!

Here is the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
Appendix III: Unclassified Working Papers
assessment of the J-1: 

To jog your memory: the J-1 was a three-stage solid fuel rocket able to place payloads of about 1,000 kg int low Earth orbit and the first NASDA rocket to be made from a  combination of existing indigenous rockets – the solid rocket booster of the H-2 and the upper stage of the M-3S II. In other words, after an awfully long, twisting and tortured route down the J-1U -> J-2 -> GX route, which was basically IHI’s bid to become a liquid engine technology integration company, the Epsilon is the direct successor of the J-1. The Epsilon is what the J-1 should have been.

Does any of this, taken from the Japan Echo of 15 years ago, sound at all similar?

Information Bulletin No.64
First Launch of Cost-Efficient J-1 Rocket Scheduled for February 1996

——————————————————————————–
January 8,1996

The National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA) is in the process of assembling a new domestically produced rocket, the J-1. Scheduled to be launched from the Tanegashima Space Center in February 1996, the J-1 features a cost-efficient design that incorporates parts of existing rockets. It will carry as its payload an experimental space vehicle that will gather data to be used in the development of a Japanese space shuttle, HOPE.
The mainstay of Japan’s space program is today the H-2, the first of which was successfully launched in 1994. The H-2, which can boost a two-ton satellite into geostationary orbit 36,000 kilometers above the equator, is a two-stage rocket fueled by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen. The J-1, on the other hand, is a three-stage rocket designed to place a satellite of about one ton in low orbit. It was jointly developed by NASDA and the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Space and Aeronautical Science with an eye to a likely increase in the demand for rockets to put into low orbit small telecommunications and other satellites.
To save on development and production costs, current plans call for the first J-1 to incorporate the type of solid-fuel rocket now being used by NASDA as boosters for the H-2; the second and third will use a combination of the M23 and M3B sold-fuel rockets that constitute the tip of ISAS’s M-3SII. The J-1, which stands 33 meters tall, measures 1.8 meters in diameter, and weighs 87 tons is rather small compared to the H-2-50 meters tall, 4 meters in diameter, 264 tons-but was developed for only one-ninth of the cost, or 3.1 billion.
The first J-1, scheduled to be launched on February 1, 1996, will carry as its payload the 1,050-kilogram HYFLEX …” [X-37B space bomber test... no no, only joking. It's nothing like the X-37B space bomber at all; here it is landing, right] “…a hypersonic flight experiment vehicle that will collect data for the development of a Japanese space shuttle, named HOPE. HYFLEX will separate from the J-1 at an altitude of 110 kilometers and glide back through the atmosphere. Scientists will be evaluating such points as HYFLEX’s heat-resistant properties as it reaches temperatures as high as 1500-1600 degrees Celsius and its stability and control systems as it hits speeds of up to Mach 15. After completing its glide, the HYFLEX will deploy a parachute and splash down in the ocean near the island of Ogasawara, where it will be retrieved by
waiting ships.

————————————–

The wonderful thing about this article is that it shows what they Japanese call the (Kyu) pichi (pitch) or the rapid assault on the higher strategic echelons of space development. It’s hard to believe going back to 1990s with the hubris and triumphalism;  with people like Tomifumi Godai, the godfather of the H-2, regaling Japan for its prowess in building better than the gaijin. The NYT article I linked to, unlike the screed put out these days, is actually worth reading! Godai’s pride in the H-2 was soon deflated though and his triumphalist series of articles in NASDA today in the 1990s has now disappeared from web and written out of history. But I remember.

It’s worth reminding people, I feel, that with a little bit more money, Japan would have had its own automated shuttle by now. It’s not doing too badly as it is with Kounotori, which is itself a technical triumph and a bargain- costing only $200 million or so to develop (officially).

But, literally, Japan lost Hope.  In caffeinated and wilder-eyed moments I often wonder how much pressure was put on Japan to sacrifice its space program on the altar of fiscal restraint when other much more wasteful spending programs survived. (I often marvel at how quickly SmartSat disappeared too…did someone in the U.S. embassy  gently whisper sweet somethings  in NICT’s ear so as not to show up the U.S. or frighten the Chinese too much?)

There is no question that the Epsilon is a highly aggressive dual-use ICBM program that actually will fulfill three functions;

a) It’s stated purpose- to provide a low-cost, highly flexible alternative to the H-2A/B for Japan’s microsatellite and science community and ASNARO/ ODA-programs

b) A fast-flexible mobile launcher for military micro/nano/pico satellites at times of increased tension or the buildup or waging of war. In fact the SPRINT series in itself does a nice job building up a standard bus system for modular payloads, which will make them highly versatile for applications starting with medium resolution/ tactical spy satellites aka ASNARO. The SPRINT-A flight is in fact a test launch for upcoming deals with Vietnam and Cambodia to supply satellites as ODA (and to keep them out of China’s orbit- again literally!)

c) A family of boosters for said purposes (a) and (b) and also as an ICBM design for if/when Japan decide to weaponsize its supergrade / plutonium stocks.

I have also put the first article I published on the Epsilon, which was originally called the ASR here, FYI:

This was one of the more important interviews I had back in the day when I was working on getting Stanford University to try to understand the scale of the changes that were occurring in Japan’s strategic thinking in terms of beginning to show deployment of Japan’s dual-use technologies- when some of the recessed hedge thinking started edging toward…

…let’s put it a different way:- and the dual-use aspect of Japan’s space development strategy started becoming the subject of polite conversation.

Basically the story is that I’d realized it had been on the cards ever since the 1998 “Taepodon flyover,” which Saadia and I call the Taepondon Trigger, when Melco handed me the pre-prepared plans for what were going to become the IGS. Funny, that, wasn’t it?

However, when I pitched to Saadia back in 2003 back in the Okura Hotel’s breakfast bar that Japan was going to militarize its space development, there was concern from her that I was going to go too far too quickly. And our first version of the book in 2005 that predicted what was going to happen (I was about 95% right, if you could put a figure on it, as it turned out) was dismissed out of hand first time round because it didn’t fit the frame. But all I was doing was applying Dick Samuel’s scholarship from beyond the aerospace sector to the space…

First meeting Takeo Kawamura in 2006 was a vital step in plugging into the fundamental changes occurring with the Kawamura Initiative (IDOJ, pp.38) that we documented in In Defense of Japan. Basically I’d gotten a heads up from Kazuto Suzuki, who played a vital role in promoting and drafting one of the key strategic changes in Japan’s normalization, the Basic Law.

Takeo Kawamura is one of those great people that you get to meet in your life who  care about what it means and will take the extra step to put it out. I was there to put the message out to an international audience that someone cared, and he did, and I did, and that was enough. It was a sort of Homer Simpson d’oh moment that started it all.

I remember back in Feb 2004 during one of my many private audiences with Mazakasu Iguchi when he’d told me…you know, they thought they’d checked everything, right down to the last bolt…they’d cleaned out MHI at Nagoya and they were now pristine clean and ready…but Nissan, they’d forgot Nissan. The bloody solid boosters. I can still remember Iguchi Sensei thumping his desk in exasperation.

It was about the same time that Takeo Kawamura, then MEXT Minister, realized he’d been dealt a dud hand. SAC was supposed to be in control of MEXT, or was it CSTP in control of everything? Nobody  really knew. That was the point.  Everybody got blamed, but nobody took the rap. Kawamura realized he was just a figurehead, and that space development was on bureaucratic autopilot. Whatever you felt about Ryutaro Hashimoto at the time, he did really have some sort of guts to try to change things. So Takeo Kawamura stepped up to the plate. The rest is, as you might say, recent history ;-) .

(Scholars have tried to push the idea of the executive taking over from the Kanryo, not realizing that that if they’d seen Yes Prime Minister, they’d know that Sir Humphrey is a two-decade pushover. I’m only half joking!)

It’s really fun to start reporting again, even if it’s only part time. Apart from Space News I haven’t been doing any proper journalism for a decade now so it’s nice to be back riding the bike and developing a beat again after a long, long break.

As I am working more for Defense News these days, I thought I would start putting my articles up. Actually the DN web database doesn’t have a record of my earlier work on J-military space, but from now on I’ll be posting more work up.

The current crossroad is the just the latest installment of a 30-year drama that has been testing the flexibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance. When my Japanese industry sources tell me they really don’t mind building Eurofighter as long as they get the technology transfers and licensed production, I really question how much they are pulling my leg. Would the U.S. really, ever allow Japan not to buy American. Would Japanese companies ever cut their 50-year relationships with their U.S. masters and colleagues and collaborators?

How things have changed; in the days of the Super Sabre, the U.S. happy give Japan even the lathes and and the blueprints and the quality control systems necessary to produce some of the most advanced technologies of the era, thus helping Japan create its machine tool industrial base and then go on to momentarily conquer the world.

But the F-X saga represents another important facet of Japan’s spin-on/off technonationalism promotion policy. In the end, will the lack of 50 planes or 150 planes really serve to tip the balance of peacetime deterrence policies in Asia. Not in the slightest. But getting the technology to build a 5th generation fighter with stealth capabilities is a strategic national issue for Japan.

Boeing, Lockheed, BAE To Vie for Japan's F-X, April 14, 2011

With the Epsilon confirmed for development, Japan’s latest reentry technology experiment appears to have been conducted successfully with the test of  the U.S. Department of Defense’s Re-entry Breakup Recorder (REBR) on Kounotori 2 on March 31.

The DOD's REBR

The DOD's REBR

REBR recorded temperature, acceleration, rotational rate and other data during the  controlled reentry and successfully phoned home that data prior to final impact and was still  transmitting while floating in the ocean. REBR was made possible by using miniature sensors and cell phone technology, built as basically a satellite phone with a heat shield.

REBR’s stated purpose is to collect data during atmospheric reentries of space hardware in order to help understand breakup and increase the safety of such reentries. Of course this data is valuable for a number of dual-use reasons. Let’s not talking about improving the accuracy of warheads for now, however.

The robotic HTV-2 (Kountori-2) is a highly-advanced automatic cargo carrier for the ISS

The REBR project is supported by the U.S. Air Force, NASA, and the Boeing Company. The first flight test of the small, autonomous device was coordinated by the Department of Defense’s Space Test Program which includes highly aggressive military space programs including the Orbital Express program which is dual-use ASAT technology demonstrator, on top of a variety of military microsatellites tested and under development by the STP.

In Japan’s case, REBR  began collecting data,  ultimately detaching from the disintegrating spacecraft and continuing in freefall from approximately 60,000 feet from the ocean. REBR effectively made a “phone call” over about five minutes before landing in the Pacific Ocean.

A second test will be REBR’s reentry aboard the European Autonomous Transfer Vehicle 2, called Johannes Kepler, in early June.

As we pointed out in In Defense of Japan, Japan has made sure to accumulate reentry targeting technology through Hyflex, Express, USERS, and so on as part of its securing the technology option to develop a counterforce strategy based on Epsilon and the ability to develop highly compact, boosted fission warheads based on the country’s supply of supergrade.

Now the gloves appear to be off with JAXA working directly with the DOD.

….First steps halted by lack of budget…

I get sort of incredulous when folks talk about the various failures of Japan’s space development programs to do this and that. The only things Japan’s space development program is guilty of is being inexpensive and successful. Oh No? Shucks. How much did Kounotori cost to develop then, and the H-2B? Burning up time indeed.

Following the Asahi’s punt at describing JAXA’s H-3 rocket earlier this year, I decided to take look at Japan’s steps toward human spaceflight via upgrading the H-2 family. After talking to MHI back in 2005, I didn’t expect too many changes, with the primary new technology driver for the H-3 being the LE-X engine.

Five years later, and things seem to be on the same course, although JAXA is now openly offering its development schedules and plans to those interested and it makes for a great look into the future.

First of all, the fact that JAXA will be embarking on a “Phase I” upgrade this April spurred me to file an article for Space News, which is now below. Initially I’d like to make comments on the missing elements of this story and background that can’t be crammed in a 550-750 word article, and then I’ll move on to future plans in more detail in Part II, which will also show just how advanced thinking is on polishing the space silverware in Japan.

First of all, here is the story, then some follow-up below:

Comments:
Ever since I first started writing on the H-II, with a story on Nissan importing CFRP technology for the  H-2A’s initial SRB-As, what, back in 1997 as I remember, we have been “waiting” for the H-IIA  to fulfill its stated public goal of being “commercially” successful.

Commercially successful. Hehe. What the hell is that supposed to mean? How much taxpayers money has been sunk into the military by Japan’s competitors to produce hardware. Where is the dividing line?

Well I’ve been attacked by some very unpleasant people about my idea that it doesn’t really, really matter if the H-2A is commercially successful or not, because the money will always be found to keep on developing Japan’s liquid (and LNG and solid) propulsion and system’s integration technology, whether the rocket makes a profit in the commercial marketplace or not.

There are several parts to this argument: but my point is that that fundamentally, money will always be found because that’s been essential part of Japan’s technonationalist industrial policy since the Meij Ishin period (see Rich Nation, Strong Army, which forms an essential plank for the arguments in In Defense of Japan).

Beyond the spin-on, spin-off paradigm, and MHI’s long-standing interest in microsatellites, MHI is very keen to get the story about about these upgrades because they show the strong commitment to improving this wonderful system, showcase MHI’s and Japan’s technologies, and well, if the yen were even 120 to the dollar, how cheap would the H-2A be compared to the Atlas anyway?

That’s wishful thinking, but it is a fact that Tanegashima’s issues don’t begin and end with ralicraltant fishing unions who need regular dollops of fiscal and pools of alcoholic lubrication to open up the launch windows.

Locals can be lubed, but the physics of getting a payload into orbit from Southern Japan don’t change no matter how much awamori is consumed. Firstly, the rocket has to take a bit of a long and winding ascent to avoid you name it South East Asian nations who don’t appreciate tons of flaming toxic space debris landing on them should the worst happen. Then, and here’s the spin, Tanegashima is quite a way off the equator meaning the H-2A is loosing out on arrival as well. So the top line is the bottom line and MHI are very keen to point out that the long-cruise capability saves (potential) customers money.

The second point I would like to make is that the upgrade I wrote about is actually a stripped down version. The Epsilon has also been hit. Despite both LVs being high priority, penny pinching means that the improvements to the H-2A and the Epsilon are actually strung out to a different timetable and diluted implementation compared to what even was the consensus for the development pathways as late as last September.

But that is for Part II

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